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 In 1956, Herbert Simon scolded researchers using 
economic theory to characterize rational choice, 
admonishing that “organisms … do not, in general, 
‘optimize’ ” (p. 129). Simon rejected the notion that 
decision makers met the god-like qualifications required 
of rational agents. Instead, he proposed that, to fully 
understand decision making, one must study two critical 
components: the cognitive capacities of the organism and 
Published in Behavioral Ecology 24 (2013), pp. 13-14; doi: 10.1093/beheco/ars089 
Copyright © 2012 Jeffrey R. Stevens.  
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Society for Behavioral Ecology.  
Used by permission. 
Submitted January 7, 2012; accepted April 17, 2012; published online September 21, 2012.  
The Bounds of Rationality and  
Cognitive Building Blocks  
Jeffrey R. Stevens  
Department of Psychology,  
238 Burnett Hall,  
University of Nebraska-Lincoln,  
Lincoln, NE 68588, USA;  
email jeffrey.r.stevens@gmail.com  
13
digitalcommons.unl.edu
14 J .  R .  Stevens  in  Behavioral  Ecology  2 4  ( 2 0 1 3 ) 
the structure of the environment in which an organism 
operates (Simon 1956). 
Despite the clear relevance of Simon’s ideas to the 
study of animal behavior, few have appreciated his 
contribution (but see Callebaut 2007). The role of the 
environment has been appropriately credited as an 
important force shaping animal behavior via the concept 
of adaptive specialization. For instance, comparative 
analysis indicates that a species’ foraging ecology likely 
molds how it deals with risk and temporal delays in 
decision making (Heilbronner et al. 2008; Rosati et al. 
2007). The cognitive capacities of organisms, however, 
have not been properly considered by models of animal 
behavior, and this is where Fawcett et al.’s notion of the 
behavioral gambit is useful. 
Unlike many economists studying human behavior, 
optimization modelers studying animal behavior 
accepted early on that animals were not optimizing. 
For instance, in the field of foraging theory, modelers 
began searching for simple rules of thumb (such as 
giving-up time rules) that animals could be using 
to approach optimal outcomes (Stephens and Krebs 
1986). But beyond developing simpler rules that avoid 
the need for sophisticated computations, little work in 
animal behavior has actively integrated psychological 
mechanisms into evolutionary accounts of behavior. 
Fawcett et al. nicely highlight the behavioral flexibility 
that learning offers animals. Expressly modeling the 
mechanisms of learning and how they influence behavior 
is underappreciated and critical for understanding the 
evolution of behavior. However, learning is not the only 
means to achieve flexibility. Conditional decision rules 
also produce behavioral flexibility, and they also require 
an understanding of the cognitive building blocks that 
must be in place for an organism to implement the rule. 
The cognitive building blocks approach suggests 
that decision rules are composed of multiple cognitive 
capacities needed to process information. As an 
example, consider the cooperative strategy tit-for-tat. 
This relatively straightforward strategy simply copies 
its opponent’s single last behavior in a cooperative 
interaction. Though tit-for-tat and its variants have 
been used extensively to model reciprocal cooperation 
(e.g., Nowak 2006), rarely do researchers consider the 
cognitive building blocks needed to implement it. Yet, tit-
for-tat requires that individual wait for future rewards, 
remember past encounters, and perhaps quantify costs 
and benefits and imitate partner actions (Stevens et 
al. 2005). Unfortunately, animals (including humans) 
have a difficult time waiting for future rewards and 
remembering specific past events, potentially limiting 
the use of tit-for-tat and its variants. Experiments 
on blue jays indicate that they only cooperate in an 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma when they play against 
a tit-for-tat strategist and the experimenter reduces 
the jay’s impulsivity (Stephens et al. 2002). Further, 
an experimental test of human memory in an iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma situation demonstrates that even 
humans have a difficult time tracking the past behavior 
of partners (Stevens et al. 2011). Thus, psychological data 
force us to rethink the kinds of strategies that organisms 
actually use in cooperative situations. 
The thrust of the behavioral gambit and cognitive 
building blocks approaches is that we need to 
fundamentally change how we model behavior. 
Optimality and game theory have generated an 
enormous amount of interesting research. But we cannot 
stop there. To better understand how humans and 
other animals behave, we must take Simon’s concept of 
bounded rationality seriously and integrate cognitive 
capacities with the structure of the environment when 
constructing models of behavior. The behavioral gambit 
has proven too risky.  
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